In this contribution we investigate the conceptual coherence of penal substitution and its moral validity. After assessing two opposing modern contributions, we turn to Reformed and medieval scholasticism. This scholastic manoeuvre sheds additional light on the analytic questions at issue. Following Owen and Scotus in their use of a relational analysis of guilt and its punishment, we argue that penal substitution is conceptually and morally coherent, albeit not univocally vis-à-vis ordinary punishment. Absent from the case of substitution is personal deservedness; (...) herein we follow Murphy. However, this leaves open the conceptual possibility of representative deservedness. (shrink)

Given Conciliar Christology and a compositionalist metaphysics of the incarnation, I explore whether ‘qua-propositions’ are capable of solving the coherence problem in Christology. I do this by probing the metaphysical aspect of qua-propositions, since ‘semantics presupposes metaphysics’. My proposal focuses on the fact that the Word accidentally owns an individual human nature. Due to that individuality, the human properties first characterise the individual human nature and, in a ‘next step’, this individual human nature characterises the Word. I call this ‘stepped (...) characterisation’. Subsequently, I show that stepped characterisation validates the use of qua-propositions in Conciliar Christology. Hence, qua-propositions are not merely ‘muddling the waters of logic’. (shrink)

G. H. Bird; Discussions: Kantian Myths, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 96, Issue 1, 1 June 1996, Pages 245–252, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristot.